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Abstract
An important tradition in philosophy holds that in order to
successfully perform a joint action, the participants must
be capable of establishing commitments on joint goals and
shared plans. This suggests that social robotics should en-
dow robots with similar competences for commitment man-
agement in order to achieve the objective of performing joint
tasks in human-robot interactions. In this paper, we exam-
ine two philosophical approaches to commitments. These ap-
proaches, we argue, emphasize different behavioral and cog-
nitive aspects of commitments that give roboticists a way to
give meaning to monitoring and pro-active signaling in joint
action with human partners. To show that, we present an ex-
ample of use-case with guiding robots and we sketch a frame-
work that can be used to explore the type of capacities and
behaviors that a robot may need to manage commitments.
Introduction
A central challenge in human-robot interaction is to devise
robots capable of interacting with humans to perform so-
called joint actions, social interactions where two or more
participants coordinate their actions in space and time to
bring about a change in the environment (Sebanz, Bekker-
ing, and Knoblich 2006). The notion of commitment plays
a pivotal role in understanding joint action (Cohen and
Levesque 1991; Bratman 1992; Gilbert 2009). In order to
perform a joint action, co-agents need to establish and han-
dle commitment regarding the shared goals and plans in-
volved in the joint action. However, the study of com-
mitments in the context of human-robot collaborative task
achievement is quite new.
As a first approximation, a commitment is in place when
an agent (the author of the commitment) has given an assur-
ance to an another agent (the recipient of the commitment)
that she will act in a certain way, when, as a result, the recip-
ient has formed an expectation regarding the actions of the
author, and when there is mutual knowledge by both parties
that this is the case. In order to build our framework of com-
mitments, we discuss two specific philosophical approaches
that emphasize different, though complementary, aspects of
Copyright c© 2019, Association for the Advancement of Artificial
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commitments: (1) The functional approach and (2) The nor-
mative approach. The first emphasizes the function of com-
mitments, how expectations reduce different forms of uncer-
tainty. The second emphasizes how such a function is carried
out; namely, by creating obligations towards one’s co-agents
and their corresponding entitlements to demand that these
obligations be satisfied. In order to demonstrate how these
approaches can give hints on the implementation of strate-
gies for HRI, we consider a use-case, in which a robot guide
takes a visitor to its destination (e.g. Rackham at the Space
City Museum (Clodic et al. 2006)). Although there is al-
ready previous research on commitments in social robotics,
this work is a first step towards generating a framework that
gives theoretical support to this previous research and at the
same time generates new avenues for future investigations.
Two Philosophical Aspects on Commitments
Establishing commitments requires the participants involved
to generate reliable expectations about the content of the
commitment, for instance, making a promise that one will
perform a particular objective or giving implicit signals that
one act in a particular way. But why do we generate such
expectations? Why do we need to establish such commit-
ments?
The Functional Approach
Arguably, what distinguishes a joint action (e.g. walking to-
gether) from the mere coordination of behavior (two peo-
ple randomly walking at the same pace) is that the part-
ners are committed to achieve a goal together (Gilbert 2006).
Furthermore, such a participatory commitment comes often
with other contralateral commitments (Roth 2004) associ-
ated to the general goal or the plan necessary to achieve it
(e.g. not speeding up, or waiting for your partner if he’s left
behind).
The necessity of establishing these different commitments
comes from the fact that even assuming that the partners de-
sire the outcome to be the case, different sources of uncer-
tainty could prevent the joint action from being carried out.
As Michael and Pacherie (2014) argue, participants can face
three sources of uncertainty during joint action:
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1. Motivational uncertainty: participants may not know
whether or not the partner is motivated to engage in the
joint action. Thus, they cannot be sure how convergent
their respective interests are or whether or not they shared
a goal.
2. Instrumental uncertainty: participants may not know
whether or not they agree about how to proceed; for in-
stance, how the participants must distribute their roles or
when and where they must act.
3. Common ground uncertainty: it may happen that the in-
strumental beliefs and motivations are not mutually man-
ifested. Thus, even if the participants share a goal or they
agree about how to proceed, they might not know that this
is the case.
But how do commitments reduce these sources of uncer-
tainty? According to the functional approach supported by
Michael and Pacherie (2014), generating commitments re-
duces uncertainty by stabilizing expectations regarding ac-
tions, beliefs and motivations and thus, facilitating the pre-
diction of the other co-actors, which makes the joint action
more fluent and efficient. In their view, the key aspects of
commitments are related to how the expectations are gen-
erated, and thus, how the commitments are established. For
instance, how co-agents generate expectations through im-
plicit and explicit communication (Austin 1962; Siposova,
Tomasello, and Carpenter 2018) or repetition (Gilbert 2006;
Michael, Sebanz, and Knoblich 2016).
The Normative Approach
In a recent paper, Fernandez Castro and Pacherie (2019)
have focused on a different aspect of commitments, namely,
how they create obligations towards one’s co-agents who are
entitled to demand that these obligations be satisfied, giving
rise to expectations that the agent will act as committed or
that, if not, co-agents will demand that she does. This view
shares with the functional approach the idea that expecta-
tions are the central element of commitments. However, they
argue that the expectations generated by commitments are of
a special kind: normative expectations.
In philosophy of mind, several authors (Greenspan 1978;
Paprzycka 1999; Wallace 1998) have emphasized that we
can distinguish two types of expectations:
1. Descriptive expectations: expectations whose violation
or frustration does not necessarily triggers reactive atti-
tudes. These expectations are tied to predictions. For ex-
ample, you can expect your friend to have a beer because
this is what she always does but if she doesn’t, this may
surprise you but not bother you.
2. Normative expectations: expectations whose violation
or frustration triggers reactive attitudes: blame 1, request
for justification or sanctions. These types of expectations
are connected to the notion of holding someone on a de-
mand. That is, the normal response to its frustration is to
1The notion of blame must be understood in very general terms
and without moral burden in here; that is, as a reaction that serves
to sanction negatively a conduct, whether this conduct is a violation
of a moral norm or not.
impose a negative reaction to the other agent for not acting
as expected. Such negative reactions are more emotion-
ally loaded and aimed at regulating the other’s behavior.
For instance, you can feel entitled to sanction your friend
when he frustrates your expectation that he will cede his
seat to an older person on the subway.
On the normative view, commitments serve to create for
oneself, or the other agent, normative expectations, so we
can ensure that every participant behaves as expected. In
this view, the key aspect of commitments is how we display
different communicative and behavioral strategies to make
explicit our obligations towards our partner and their own
obligations towards us; for instance, by blaming, making the
other aware of what is expected or apologizing when some-
thing goes wrong.
At this point, it is worth noticing that the two approaches
are not necessarily incompatible. In fact, to the extent that
they emphasize different aspects of how agents handle com-
mitments, they can be regarded as complementary. In our
view, managing commitments involves both generating ex-
pectations that facilitate the reduction of uncertainty and dis-
playing repairing and regulative strategies when such expec-
tations are frustrated.
Related work
Several computational models of commitment management
have already been proposed. Joint intention theory (Cohen
and Levesque 1990) introduces the notion of commitment
in relation to the goal of the collaborative task: “if a team
is jointly committed to some goal, then under certain con-
ditions, until the team as a whole is finished, if one of
the members comes to believe that the goal is finished but
that this is not yet mutually known, she will be left with
a persistent goal to make the status of the goal mutually
known”. Shared Plans theory (Grosz and Kraus 1996) uses
individual intentions to establish commitment of collabora-
tors to their joint activity. Interestingly, Shared Plans the-
ory proposes also the notion of agent’s commitments to its
collaborating partners’ abilities, as well as the notion of
helpful behavior and contracting action. Other works em-
phasize grounding as a kind of commitment (Clark 1996;
Clark 2006): “Once we have formulated a message, we must
do more than just send it off. We need to assure ourselves
that is has been understood as we intended to be.” Clark also
proposes to consider on one side basic joint activity or joint
activity proper and on the other side the coordinating joint
actions based on communicative acts (Clark 2006). In the
same vein, Klein et al. (2005) describes ”basic compact” as
a kind of contract that need to be shared by the cooperative
agents.
Several implementations using commitments have also
been proposed 2, for instance, Collagen architecture (Rich,
Sidner, and Lesh 2001; Sidner et al. 2005) in collabora-
tive conversation. In human-robot interaction, we can find
implementations of commitments in different settings such
2In the robotic domain, it is the word “engagement” and not
“commitment” which is often used. For the sake of simplicity we
will continue using the term “commitment” in the paper
as in Human-Robot Interaction Operating System (Fong et
al. 2005), robot behavior toolkit (Huang and Mutlu 2013),
robot tutelage (Hoffman and Breazeal 2007) or linked to su-
pervision, communicative acts and grounding (Clodic et al.
2007), (Clodic 2007).
In the framework of Rackham, a robot guide at the Space
City museum3 from 2002 to 2005 (Clodic et al. 2006), we
also already used the notion of commitments. In that exper-
iment, we defined a set of commitments to the task : Rack-
ham commitment to the task (obtained when the robot de-
cided to do the task), Rackham’s belief concerning the vis-
itor’s belief about Rackham commitment to the task (ob-
tained once the robot told the visitor that it will perform the
task), Rackahm’s belief concerning the visitor commitment
to the task (obtained once the visitor agrees to do the task).
However, commitments were mostly used at task setup and
not really handled during task execution.
The model we propose hereafter takes inspiration from
this work. It could be seen as complementary to these mod-
els, theories and implementation as it helps to focus on the
way we could define and manage commitments during the
execution of the task and not just on how commitments can
be established at the beginning of the task. The Rackham
experiment (Clodic et al. 2006) allowed us to note the im-
portance of the quality of interaction. We noticed that: “a
continuous interaction all along the mission is fundamental
to keep visitor interest. The robot must continuously check
the presence of the guided person, show him that it knows
where (s)he is (...)”. At that time, it was difficult for us to
model that since it was not really part of the task by itself
and was done in an intuitive way. In one sense, we think that
the theoretical framework we propose here will help us to
capture and flesh out this intuition.
Implementing Commitment
Framework
We have not yet implemented the proposed framework.
Here, we are introducing it using an example, a robot guide
such as Rackham at the Space City Museum. In that exam-
ple, once the destination has been chosen, there should be a
joint task of “go to the destination” where Rackham should
“execute trajectory” whereas the visitor should “follow the
robot”. Regarding commitments, we propose that managing
commitments is a social skill which requires capacities that
are independent of the capacities required to perform the
particular actions in place (e.g. execute trajectory for Rack-
ham and follow the robot for the visitor). In our case, that
means that commitment management could be modeled as
something aggregated to the actions of the task and linked to
expectations.
Given the lessons of the functional and the normative ap-
proach, we advance that the function of commitment as a re-
duction of uncertainty and its normative aspect must be two
fundamental elements of the framework. Such elements are
present in two different moments of the joint action. First, its
function as a reduction tool is exhibited in the repertoire of
3http://www.laas.fr/robots/rackham
actions dedicated to insuring the mutual understanding that
the commitment is in place before and during the interac-
tion. Second, its normative aspect becomes evident when the
commitment is frustrated and certain reactions, responses,
and repairs became necessary. In what follows, we present
how our framework would depict these two moments.
Generating Commitments
Considering a commitment as a reduction tool implies that
ascribing or representing a partner as undertaking a com-
mitment must be tied to a repertoire of actions aiming at
insuring the establishment of a mutual understanding of the
expectations involvede.g. social signals and cues or regula-
tive actions. Such actions can vary depending on whether or
not the actor is the agent expecting the other to perform the
action (assigning a commitment) or the agent who should
act as expected (undertaking the commitment). In our ex-
ample, Rackham can expect the human to follow him and
undertake the commitment of adapting the speed to human
pace (which can also be modeled as the human expectation
regarding the robot). For a sake of simplicity, from the robot
point of view, such difference can be represented in terms of
assignations of expectations:
• Expectation (Human follows)
• Expectation (Robot adapts speed)
Given the function of commitments, the robot must be able
to actively provide different cues that facilitate human un-
derstanding of the expectations in place, but also, he must
be able to monitor that the human is behaving as he should
(See Figure 1). In the guiding example, when Rackham ex-
pects the human to follow (Expectation (Human follows)),
he must possess the following capacities:
• Exhibiting/Signaling the expectation Rackham must
provide reliable cues regarding what he expects from the
visitor in order to make him aware of it. One way of es-
tablishing such a signal is through verbal communication,
for instance, saying “I accompany you to your destination,
please follow me”.
• Monitoring: Rackham must be able to recognize the vis-
itor’s action and be sure he is behaving as expected, that
is, monitoring that the visitor is following.
Certainly, the type of reliable signals in place varies with
the assignation of expectations. In this case, when the ex-
pectation involves the robot itself, he must be sure that the
human knows what he is going to do, so the human does
not face any type of uncertainty regarding robots behavior.
Furthermore, the dynamic nature of joint actions requires
the participants to reinforce the pertinent expectations. In
our example, thus, assignation of expectations to the human
(Robot adapts speed) must be tied to the following capaci-
ties:
• Anticipating Expectation: Rackham must make clear
that he is capable of adapting to the speed to the human,
for instance, using verbal expressions like indirect speech
acts (Are you in a rush? We can go faster if you want).
«I accompany 
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destination, please 
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Figure 1: Framework for generating commitments for a guid-
ing task: 1) When the robot assigns a commitment to the human
(the human must follow (Human follows)), the following capaci-
ties are required: Exhibiting expectations to make the other aware
of her obligations; Monitoring expectations: observe and analyse
the other agent behavior and detect if she violates expectations.
2) When the robot assigns a commitment to itself (he must adapt
speed (Robot adapts speed)), the following capacities are required:
Anticipating expectations to make the human aware of the robots
obligations ; Reinforcing expectations: to make the human aware
that the robot that he keeps committed to the task.
• Reinforcing Expectation: Rackham must maintain the
human expectation that the robot will adapt to his speed.
For instance, exhibiting some back and forth movement
that makes the human aware that Rackham is still com-
mitted to the task.
Repairing
Of course, expectations can be frustrated or fulfilled, and this
is where the normative aspects of commitments are made
explicit. As the normative approach emphasizes, commit-
ments enable participants to hold others on demand and
regulate and influence their actions when a particular ac-
tion is frustrated. This gives to social robotics an impor-
tant element to improve social interaction by using com-
mitment management as a mechanism for reparation. Given
our representation of expectations (Expectation (Human fol-
lows)/Expectation (Robot adapts speed)), we can assume
two plausible violations in the context of our example:
• The violation of Expectation (Human follows): the visitor
does not follow.
• The violation of Expectation (Robot adapts speed): the
robot is going too slow (or too fast) or the human bump
into the robot
Now, considering the first type of violation, the robot must
be able to execute two different actions: reaction and repair.
The reaction is necessary to make the human understand that
the expectation has been frustrated, and thus, that he is re-
sponsible for his commitment. Furthermore, such a reaction
must be a facilitator for negotiating a re-engagement or re-
pair. In our example, we can implement these two actions as
follows:
• Reaction: when the expectation is frustrated (e.g. the vis-
itor does not follow), Rackham must be able to react to
the violation in a way that makes the visitor aware that he
should be following. For instance, Rackham could stop,
look back and adopt a posture of wait-and-see attitude.
• Repair: Rackham must be equipped with repairing strate-
gies that facilitate the re-engagement in the task, for in-
stance, approaching the visitor and asking whether every-
thing is all right. Such a reparation would facilitate the
conclusion of the general task, but also, it would make the
human aware of his obligations to the robot, reinforcing
the motivation for interaction.
Concerning the violation of the robot expectation, the nec-
essary abilities of the robot should differ in several respects.
In addition to being able to react and repair in a different way
to when it is the human who is at fault, the robot must be able
to recognize plausible signals that it is not behaving as ex-
pected4. In our example, these capacities can be regarded as
follows:
• Recognition of reactions: when the expectation is frus-
trated (e.g. Rackham goes too fast or too slow), the robot
must be able to notice when the visitor does not follow
anymore or, on the contrary, bumps into the robot because
it is too slow. Moreover, Rackham must be able to recog-
nize some natural reactions to violation of expectations,
like verbal petitions such as “Hey!” or “Wait for me!.
• Reaction: the recognition that the robot has violated an
expectation must trigger an excusing reaction to make the
visitor aware that it knows that it has violated the commit-
ment; for instance, apologizing to the visitor.
• Repair: the reaction must be followed by a repair strategy
of the commitment to ensure that the joint action takes
place; for instance, slowing down or speeding up accord-
ing to the human’s needs.
Future Work
In the previous sections, we have proposed that design-
ing social robots with the capacity for managing commit-
ments can facilitate human-robot interaction. Our central
4Certainly, we could provide more autonomy to the capacity of
the robot to handle commitments by given the capacity of evalu-
ating the situation and recognize that he may not be fulfilling the
expectation, and thus, reacting and repairing before the human ex-
presses his discontent.
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Figure 2: Framework for repairing when a case of violation is de-
tected: 1) When the robot detects a violation of the human, he must
React to violation of expectations to make the other aware that their
obligations are not satisfied; Repair the joint action. 2) In the case
of the robot violation, he must Recognize reactions in order to de-
tect the violation; React to make the human aware that he knows
that he made a mistake; and Repair the joint action.
contention is that such a capability, understood as necessary
for, but independent of, joint action, plays a central role in
the reduction of different types of uncertainties and as a way
of enabling participants to react to frustrations of expecta-
tions that may undermine the task. Drawing on philosoph-
ical approaches to commitments, we have proposed that a
commitment management mechanism must be composed of
different sub-capabilities for signaling, recognizing signals,
monitoring actions, reacting to violations, and repairing dif-
ferent expectations on both the human and robot side. In this
section, we would like to propose two lines of development
that, we believe, could enrich our framework and open fu-
ture research avenues.
First, an important way to in which our framework could
be extended is by considering the capacity for selecting dif-
ferent signaling strategies depending on the partner. Con-
forming to expectations or commitments strongly depends
on a variety of motivational sources including emotions
(Fehr and Camerer 2007; Sugden 2000; Colombo 2014),
pro-social dispositions (Godman 2013), need to belong (Fer-
nandez Castro and Pacherie 2019) or reputation manage-
ment (Michael, Sebanz, and Knoblich 2016). These types
of motivations are important when deciding on and select-
ing the appropriate signal for a particular expectation. For
instance, a robot should be capable of deciding on the most
appropriate way to ask someone to do something (e.g. using
a flat or jovial tone of voice) depending on the assumed mo-
tivation in the context (e.g. reputation in a context of work
vs pro-social disposition in a playful context). Moreover,
ideally, taking into account these motivational components
would not only help the robot to select the appropriate signal
for a particular expectation but also, to identify and adapt to
the particular type of signal used by the human. Being capa-
ble of distinguishing someone’s motivation and readiness to
interact (e.g. distinguish a good teammate from a bad team-
mate) would provide the robot with better means of adapting
and reacting to possible violations during the joint action.
Second, another future direction of research for our
framework would be to explore more robust and flexible
ways of dealing with the reactions to violations of expec-
tations. Following the functional approach to the notion of
commitment, we can advance that an important number of
frustrations of expectations would depend on one of the
different types of uncertainties (motivation, instrumental or
common ground). One plausible improvement of our frame-
work would be dedicated to designing robots capable for de-
termining which source of uncertainty causes the violation
and being able to select different repair strategies and reac-
tions depending on the source. To give an example, if Robot
could determine the reason why the visitor does not follow
it, e.g. motivation: the visitor found a friend; instrumental:
the visitor found an obstacle, it could adapt its answer de-
pending on this factor, for instance, waiting for the human,
or approaching her and giving assistance.
Conclusion
Managing commitments is a central aspect of joint action,
and thus, it should be taken into consideration in the design
of social robots. In order to do that, we have explored how
different philosophical approaches to commitment can pro-
vide useful suggestions to roboticists for designing more ef-
ficient robots capable of engaging in joint actions. We have
presented two complementary proposals that emphasize dif-
ferent behavioral and cognitive aspects of commitments that
we must concentrate on for the study of joint action for
human-robot interaction.
To design capacities for managing commitments, we must
give to the robot abilities to signal its expectations on the
one hand and to monitor humans expectations, reactions and
signals on the other. We must also give the human different
means of understanding the robot’s expectations, reactions
and signals on the one hand and of conveying his expecta-
tions to the robot on the other. These monitoring and signal-
ing abilities should not be considered part of the action in it-
self but are needed for the interaction. In this sense perhaps,
we should design a kind of code to help the management of
these aspects on both the robot’s and on human side (e.g.
a kind of common interface that is understandable by every
robot).
Finally, we have advanced two different research avenues
that may enrich our framework. First, one may explore how
to design more flexible and adaptable signals depending
on the assumed source of motivation behind the joint ac-
tion. Moreover, such a detection of motivation may help the
robots to adapt in case of violation. Second, we have specu-
lated that, when there is a violation of expectation, the source
of the violation could come from the different uncertainties
explored by the functional approach. As a result, a plausible
line of investigation may research how to design the ability
to determine the source of violation and adapt depending on
the source.
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